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As the European Union prepares for the next 
European parliamentary election of May 2014, 
any talk of migration issues appears to have 
mostly been relegated to far-right parties that 
could be tempted to renationalise the European 
immigration policy. Moreover after the tragic 
events off the coast of Lampedusa, where 360 
people drowned with their ship attempting to 
cross over to Italy, the European migration 
policy was accused of being non-existent, 
inefficient or at least of showing insufficient 
solidarity towards some European Member 
States.  
The Task Force Mediterranean was set up 
following the Justice and Home Affairs Council 
of 7-8 October 2013. Chaired by the European 
Commission, it made concrete proposals on 
December 3rd intending to prevent such 
tragedies from happening ever again, that were 
well-received by the December European 
Council.1 These proposals will also be discussed 
during the preparation of the post-Stockholm 
Programme, which should be adopted by June 
2014 and should provide the European Union 
with a roadmap in terms of Justice, Freedom 
and Security for 2015-2020. Considering the 
Task Force’s conclusions, what type of solidarity 
Solidarity is a founding principle of the 
European migration policy. To hold 
true, Member States must be faithful to 
their common commitment to 
European migration rules and 
implement fair burden sharing of the 
costs attached to border controls. 
However, solidarity among Member 
States appears altogether fragile and 
under threat, a situation that could 
jeopardise the founding principle of the 
free movement of persons in the 
European Union’s space. The recent 
solidarity crisis among Member States 
was solved by an increased 
externalisation of the European 
migration policy. Consequently, for the 
EU to live up to its values, it will have 
to prove itself generous towards third 
countries. 
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is likely to develop within the framework of the 
post-Stockholm Programme? 
1. SOLIDARITY AS A FOUNDING PRINCIPLE 
OF THE EUROPEAN MIGRATION POLICY 
1.1. Evolution of the European migration 
policy 
In spite of a large diversity of migration flows2 
and Member State policies, the European 
common asylum and immigration policy has 
experienced huge developments in the last thirty 
years. Absent from the Rome Treaty and from 
the Single European Act, it first developed in a 
totally intergovernmental process within the 
framework of the 1985 Schengen convention. 
Then, with the 1992 Maastricht treaty, it was 
introduced within the third intergovernmental 
pillar. After the Amsterdam treaty, it has 
progressively become a common policy and, 
since the Lisbon Treaty, the ordinary legislative 
procedure (art. 77 to 79 TFEU) applies to it. 
The European migration policy, which counts 
among the EU shared competencies (Art. 4 
TFEU) now includes border controls, asylum, 
legal immigration (family and labour 
immigration), as well as integration of third-
country nationals. Three main factors may help 
us to understand these evolutions: 1) 
improvements in the free movement of persons 
within the European space made control of its 
borders an issue of common interest, as all kinds 
of traffic could benefit from the removal of 
internal borders; 2) the strain felt by Member 
States tackling the complexity of transnational 
migration phenomena on their own; and 3) the 
fact that immigrants mostly focus on a couple of 
specific Member States made solidarity between 
Member States with borders doubling as EU 
external borders and the main EU end-
destination countries necessary. 
Solidarity among European Member States can 
be understood in two ways. It’s because 
Member States are faithful to their common 
commitment to reinforce European external 
borders that they can accept free movement of 
persons within the European space (Art. 67 
TFEU). But for the Member States that 
experience the largest migration flows, solidarity 
also means a fair burden sharing of the costs 
attached to border controls (Art. 80 TFEU). In 
2013, Italy and Malta received €92 and €23 
million respectively from the External Borders, 
Return, and Refugee funds. For 2014-2020, two 
new funds – the “Asylum and Migration Fund” 
(€3.1 billion), and the “Internal Security Fund” 
(€3.7 billion) – are in charge of burden sharing 
among Member States. 
1.2. Various instruments of migration 
solidarity have developed over the last thirty 
years. 
Most of them were developed to be used in 
the field of border controls. The 2006 
Schengen code aims at defining common 
conditions and modalities of border checks at 
the external and internal borders of the EU. The 
2009 Visa Code sets out two lists of countries 
whose nationals shall – or not – buy a visa to be 
allowed to enter the Schengen Area. It aims at 
defining common conditions and procedures for 
issuing visas, which should contribute to 
harmonising the power of attraction of Member 
States to third-country nationals. 
In order to enhance the efficiency of border 
controls, European Member States also 
developed several common information 
systems. The Schengen Information System 
(SIS) set up in 1985 and renewed in April 2013 
(SIS-II) allows the sharing of information about 
people whose entry within the Schengen Area 
was refused, either because they are considered 
as a danger to the public order and national 
security, or because they were deported after an 
irregular stay in a member state of the Schengen 
Area. The Visa Information System (VIS) 
established in 2004 allows visa applications to be 
traced in order to fight “visa shopping”, and “to 
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contribute to the prevention of threats to the 
internal security of any of the Member States”. 
Consequently, the amount of data collected by 
VIS is significant. The EU Border Surveillance 
Initiative (EUROSUR) which came into force in 
December 2013 allows Member States to 
exchange operational information and to 
cooperate between themselves and with the 
FRONTEX Agency to reduce the number of 
migrants entering the EU illegally and to prevent 
cross-border criminality. Ultimately, the project 
of a Smart Border Package, which has been 
under discussion since February 2013, aims at 
using new technology in order to improve 
border control efficiency. A reliable and quick 
system of registration could simplify border 
checks for people who frequently come into the 
EU, and an enter/exit system could, among 
other things, allow the identification of people 
who overstay their welcome in the EU after 
their visa has expired. 
Moreover, several operational mechanisms 
support Member States in their management of 
border checks: the FRONTEX Agency, set up 
in 2005, supports Member States in their naval, 
air and land-based common external operations. 
Regarding visa applications, some agreements 
between Member States could allow those with 
small diplomatic networks to use the visa 
facilities of Member States that have larger 
diplomatic networks. 
Thus, European solidarity in the field of border 
checks is well-developed. 
In the field of asylum, the Dublin Regulation 
sets out rules to designate the Member State in 
charge of examining an asylum application. This 
Member State might not be the point of original 
entry into European space in cases of family 
reunification for instance. But the Dublin 
Regulation tends to put responsibility on the 
Member State which played the biggest role in 
the entry of a migrant. However, the renewed 
Dublin Regulation provides a rapid alert 
mechanism which makes it easier to identify 
Member States (like Greece, potentially) whose 
national asylum system proves unsatisfying, and 
organises solidarity measures in favour of these 
Member States. Moreover, the 2001 “temporary 
protection directive” aims at ensuring the 
balanced distribution of asylum seekers among 
Member States when their flow increases 
dramatically, for example during conflicts. 
Operational mechanisms of solidarity also 
developed in the field of asylum. The recording 
of migrants’ fingerprints within the EURODAC 
system makes it possible to trace them within 
the EU and helps Member States in their fight 
against “Asylum shopping”. Consequently, 
asylum seekers might be transferred back to the 
Member State that was first designated to 
examine their claim. The European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO), which started operating 
in Malta in June 2011 also aims at supporting 
concrete cooperation among Member States, 
such as sharing information on the situation of 
human rights in the countries of origin, sending 
technical support teams to Member States facing 
difficulties, or promoting the transfer of asylum 
seekers. 
Eventually, in the field of legal immigration, 
various directives (on long-term residency, 
researchers or highly skilled workers (see the 
“blue card directive”) tend to harmonise the 
conditions of entry and residence of these 
migrants. These rules are less developed since 
Member States competing with each other to 
attract certain categories of third-country 
workers are reluctant to see their 
competitiveness fully harmonised. 
Regarding all the existing solidarity measures, it 
would thus be unfair to say that a European 
migration policy does not exist. 
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2. SOLIDARITY AMONG MEMBER STATES 
APPEARS ALTOGETHER FRAGILE AND 
UNDER THREAT 
Whatever the common European migration 
rules are, Member States always remain the 
authority of last resort when deciding whether 
or not to allow the entry or issuance of a 
residence permit to third-country nationals. 
However, their national policies vary a lot and 
this has an impact on their appeal for migrants. 
In 2012, while Greece provided international 
protection to only 0.9% of its asylum seekers in 
first instance, Malta provided international 
protection (subsidiary protection) to 90.1% of 
them.3 Moreover, the European immigration 
policy has a variable geometry. UK, Ireland and 
Denmark benefit from derogatory clauses, 
allowing them to choose to take part – or not – 
in some elements of this policy. The lack of 
solidarity is also reflected in the fact that 
European rules do not provide for an automatic 
recognition of international protection allowed 
by one Member State in another one.4 In 2012, a 
European pilot relocation programme helped 
with the relocation of 105 protected people in 
Malta to another Member State. However, 
another 307 individuals were resettled in the 
United States. Thus, in this particular instance, 
American solidarity vis-à-vis Malta proved 
greater than European internal solidarity. 
Moreover, several European provisions 
designed to enhance solidarity among 
Member States are not or rarely used and 
cannot be developed. Very few common visa 
issuance centres have been created (in Chisinau, 
Moldavia and in Praia, Cape Verde) and their 
record appears disappointing because Member 
States are very reluctant to share their sovereign 
rights in this field. Regarding asylum, the 2001 
directive on temporary protection has never 
been implemented although the migration flows 
linked to the Arab Spring and the Syrian crisis 
would fully justify resorting to this directive.5 
Moreover, although the Dublin/EURODAC 
system and the EASO are supposed to organise 
transfers of asylum seekers between Member 
States, these transfers only account for 1.7% of 
asylum applications in France.6 The cost and 
administrative complexity of this mechanism 
explain that Member States gave up on using it. 
Moreover, in 2011, the European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Court of 
Justice banned the transfer of asylum seekers to 
Greece, considering that the asylum procedures 
and reception conditions were inhuman and the 
treatment or punishments degrading.7 Another 
example of rarely used provisions in the field of 
legal immigration is the blue card directive. 
Because Member States fight each other to 
attract highly skilled workers, they only agreed 
on facultative provisions aiming to harmonise 
the reception conditions of these types of 
migrants. The lack of European solidarity in the 
field of legal migration, which affects very 
sensitive issues such as employment, is also 
reflected in the fact that the European 
Commission had to withdraw the idea of a 
European immigration code aiming at 
organising any kind of legal migration. As a 
consequence, legal immigrants are still 
confronted with very fragmented statuses 
(researchers, seasonal workers…) and the rights 
they enjoy might change significantly according 
to their status. 
Another telling sign of the lack of solidarity 
between Member States is the fact that they are 
not always fair in the implementation of 
common rules. In practice, the 
Dublin/EURODAC system doesn’t work 
properly because some Member States (Greece, 
Italy, Malta) are slow to register or do not 
register the asylum seekers’ fingerprints, 
allowing the latter to leave the territory and seek 
asylum in another Member State. During the 
Arab Spring, in early 2011, Italy, considering 
that the EU wasn’t being supportive enough 
while it faced an influx of 28.000 migrants, 
unilaterally decided on April 5th to grant all of 
  
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
5 
 
them 6-month humanitarian permissions to stay 
and move freely within the European space, 
possibly infringing the loyal cooperation 
principle. Consequently, France, fearing an 
increased flow of migrants, reintroduced border 
checks vis-à-vis Italy.8 However, the flow of 
migrants did not account for more than 400 
people. Thereby, France probably infringed the 
proportionality principle. 
This Franco-Italian dispute, which shows a 
lack of solidarity among Member States, 
could jeopardise the principle of the free 
movement of persons within the European 
space, even though it is a fundamental principle 
of European integration. In reaction to this, the 
Schengen Area governance reform which was 
adopted on October 8th 20139 added new 
criteria. Beyond threats to public order and 
internal security, Member States are allowed to 
reintroduce internal border checks within the 
Schengen Area in case a Member State 
encounters serious and persistent deficiencies in 
controlling the external borders of the Schengen 
Area. Hence, as the liberalisation of the 
movement of persons made the development of 
European solidarity necessary for the control of 
external borders, failing to control them might 
bring about the reinstatement of internal 
borders within the Schengen Area. 
3. WAS THE RECENT SOLIDARITY CRISIS 
AMONG MEMBER STATES SOLVED BY 
THE EXTERNALISATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN MIGRATION POLICY? 
After the tragic sinking of boats off the coasts of 
Lampedusa and Malta, in October 2013, calls 
were made to enhance European solidarity and 
alleviate the burden taken on by Italy and Malta. 
3.1. Internal solidarity is flawed 
The Commission decided to give €30 million to 
Italy and €20 million to other Member States 
experiencing the largest flows of migrants. 
However, the Task Force stresses that solidarity 
among Member States – especially via 
FRONTEX joint operations, EASO support 
and relocation of protected people in Italy or 
Malta – should go hand in hand with the full 
acceptance of their responsibility in the control 
of the EU external borders. 
Moreover, a new reform of the Dublin 
Regulation, including a system to distribute 
asylum seekers was discussed. However, 
considering that, in 2012, Italy and Malta 
received 15.700 and 2.000 asylum applications 
respectively, while Germany received 77.500 of 
them and France 60.500,10 heads of states and 
governments refused to remove the 
responsibility of controlling the EU external 
borders from peripheral Member States. 
Consequently, they also refused to modify the 
Dublin Regulation and to implement a new 
method of distribution of asylum seekers among 
Member States. 
During the European Council of 24th and 25th 
October 2013, Member States showed solidarity 
in two fields: “the priority of prevention and 
protection” and “the principle of solidarity and 
of a fair sharing of responsibilities”. These 
orientations were developed in the conclusions 
of the Task Force Mediterranean,11 and were 
agreed on 19th and 20th December 2013 at the 
European Council. 
3.2. Preventing irregular immigration and 
protecting the EU from it? 
In order to improve the control of the migration 
flows, the European Council and the Task Force 
propose intensifying the fight against human 
smuggling and human trafficking and increasing 
the effectiveness of return policies. 
To this end, Europol will enhance its 
cooperation with other European agencies 
fighting against human trafficking and organised 
crime (FRONTEX, EASO and Interpol), and 
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with Member States. To achieve this, the Task 
Force proposes that FRONTEX and Europol 
rapidly sign operational agreements allowing 
exchange of personal data. Moreover, the EU 
supports capacity building programs in third 
countries mostly concerned with human 
trafficking and organised crime, especially in 
Africa. Besides, there is talk of using certain 
instruments of foreign and defense policy in 
order to fight criminal organisations which 
operate in third countries. Eventually, the 
European Union aims at enhancing European 
texts that organise sanctions against people 
supporting entry transit and irregular stay 
(November 2002 directive). However, one 
should be careful that exchanges of personal 
data do not infringe on migrants’ fundamental 
rights, and that sanctions, which are necessary to 
make the fight against criminal networks 
credible, do not lead to the incrimination of 
humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, one must 
be aware that, without smugglers, most of 
people in need of international protection could 
not reach Europe, since it is very difficult for 
them to get visas from European Member 
States. Therefore, intensifying the fight against 
migrant smuggling and trafficking could also 
reduce the access of migrants to European 
asylum procedures, unless more visas are issued. 
The EU will also develop more readmission 
agreements according to which third countries 
commit themselves to readmitting their 
nationals, third-country citizens or stateless 
people who pass through their territory. Since 
1999, the European Union negotiated 18 
readmission agreements with third countries 
such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Balkan countries and Cape 
Verde. 13 of these agreements have been 
applied. 
In order to help these countries fight irregular 
immigration, the EU can support the 
development of their border control systems. 
However, the EU appears more interested in 
these agreements than third countries that 
would not benefit from migrants’ remittances 
anymore and would have to pay for their 
readmission. Without counterparts such as visa 
facilitation or increase in development aid, some 
of these agreements, which are sometimes under 
discussion for years (with Morocco for instance) 
have not been approved so far. Above all, the 
asylum systems of third countries do not always 
provide asylum seekers with the same guarantees 
of their fundamental rights than those of the 
Member States.12 For instance, Ukraine, having 
signed a readmission agreement with the EU in 
2007, tried to send people who had been 
recognised as refugees by the UNHCR back to 
Russia.13 Moreover, some readmission 
agreements were signed with countries – such as 
Sri Lanka in 2005, or Pakistan in 2010 – where 
persecutions on grounds of religion, political 
opinions or ethnic belonging are not a thing of 
the past.  
Adopting the same approach, Member States 
within the European Council agreed to enhance 
the FRONTEX activities in the Mediterranean 
and off the South-Eastern borders of the EU, 
and on promoting cooperation with other 
agencies such as the European Maritime Safety 
Agency and the European Union Satellite 
Centre. The implementation since December 
2013 of the European Border Surveillance 
System will allow an extension to Libya, then 
Morocco and Egypt of a Sea Horse Network 
program organising FRONTEX cooperation 
with third countries in order to enhance 
detection of irregular trans-border movements. 
The detection of small boats carrying irregular 
immigrants should be improved from their point 
of departure. Every ship will be reminded of its 
international duty to provide rescue at sea to 
migrants in distress, while guarantying that it 
won’t be sanctioned and that it will be able to 
quickly unload people who have been saved.  
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The choice was made to intervene as far as 
possible off the European shores in order to 
reduce (as much as possible) the ability of 
migrants to reach EU territory. However, this 
could impede the implementation of the 2008 
return directive, which applies only to third-
country nationals staying irregularly “on the 
territory of a member state”. But this directive, 
although heavily criticized,14 provides common 
norms and procedures that protect the 
fundamental rights of people from third 
countries staying irregularly in a Member State. 
Member States shall for instance take into 
account the child’s superior interest, the family 
unity and the returnee’s state of health, and they 
shall also respect the principle of non-
deportation.  
Stopping migrants as far as possible from the 
EU might contribute to solving the problem of 
sharing the burden of asylum seekers and the 
reception of immigrants among Member States, 
as Italy, Malta, and Greece but also France and 
Germany would receive a reduced number of 
these migrants. 
As a matter of fact, externalisation of the 
European migration policy could prevent 
Member States from squabbling over the burden 
sharing of immigrants, and keep temptations of 
reintroducing internal borders within the 
Schengen Area at bay. 
However, will this externalisation of the EU 
migration policy, which moves the burden on to 
third countries receiving immigrants compensate 
for the weakness of intra-European solidarity? 
Isn’t this externalisation at risk of being to the 
detriment of the migrants’ fundamental rights? 
3.3. Solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibilities with third countries? 
In order to maintain a high level of fundamental 
rights protection of migrants in general, and 
asylum seekers more specifically, the European 
Council and the Task Force Mediterranean 
proposes enhancing EU cooperation with third 
countries in the field of development as well as 
in that of asylum. This requires a lot of work. 
An extensive cooperation programme with 
third countries: in view of short and mid-term 
actions to limit migrant flows, the EU’s declared 
goal is to discourage illegal migrants from setting 
off on perilous journeys. Hence the EU is 
planning to support third countries’ border 
control infrastructures, particularly in the 
south and east of the Mediterranean. 
Information campaigns about the dangers linked 
to illegal immigration will be developed. 
Moreover, work to strengthen the capacities of 
these countries, notably via the provision of 
European Liaison Offices (ILO), is due to be 
supported, notably by Turkey and Morocco. A 
new generation of Euromed police programmes 
are due to be implemented this year and the 
West African Police Information System 
(WAPIS) programme led by Interpol is due to 
be strengthened. FRONTEX’s Atlantic 
Seahorse Cooperation Network programme 
with third countries which presently involves 
Spain, Portugal, Senegal, Mauritania, Cape Verde 
and Morocco in the fight against illegal 
immigration, is due to be extended to Libya and 
Egypt. Mobility partnerships between the EU 
and third countries like Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, 
Libya, Algeria and Lebanon, which aim to set up 
legal migration in exchange for the latter 
countries’ commitment to countering illegal 
immigration, are also due to be finalised or 
negotiated. However, the Task Force 
Mediterranean highlights that for the effective 
implementation of this cooperation the goodwill 
of third countries and the necessary 
consideration of their expectations by the EU 
are required. 
In terms of asylum, regional protection 
programmes financed by the EU aim to help 
third countries improving their local 
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infrastructures and their administrative and legal 
capabilities to host asylum seekers and the 
processing of their requests. Some programmes 
have already been established in North Africa 
(with Libya, Tunisia and Egypt) and in the Horn 
of Africa (Kenya and Djibouti). They are due to 
be enhanced by the inclusion of the countries of 
the Sahel. In September 2013, the EU, 
encompassing the Commission and the Member 
States, made €1.8 billion available in support of 
7 million people affected by the Syrian conflict. 
This seemed to spearhead emergency 
reconstruction aid in support of this region. 
More specifically, the European Commission is 
elaborating a regional protection programme to 
include Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq to address the 
consequences of the conflict in Syria and to limit 
the risks associated with the destabilisation of 
the neighbouring countries which at present are 
hosting 2.3 million refugees. However, the 
experience of the regional protection 
programmes has shown that when launched in 
countries that are not exemplary in terms of 
Human Rights’ protection (Ukraine, Belarus) 
they are not always implemented in the spirit of 
protecting the fundamental rights that they are 
supposed to disseminate.  
The Task Force and the European Council of 
December 2013 also highlighted the importance 
of resettlement programmes. These 
programmes aim to offer people who have been 
recognised as refugees outside of Europe by the 
UN Refugee Agency the possibility of settling 
down legally in a Member State in the long term. 
The challenges seem enormous when we realise 
that in 2012, only 4.500 people15 benefited from 
resettlement in a Member State and, in 
December 2013, the European Union had only 
taken in 12.340 people fleeing the Syrian conflict 
(i.e. 0.54% of the total number of people 
displaced by this conflict) mainly for 
humanitarian reasons, and not based on 
conventional protection.16 
In the first half of 2014 the Commission is 
planning to organise a conference with the HCR 
on the resettlement of the most vulnerable 
populations. Undoubtedly, the European Union, 
which took 17% of all refugees in the world in 
2012,17 would then have to fully accept its global 
share of processing and taking in asylum 
seekers.  
Moreover in view of the European strategy 
that will replace the Stockholm Programme 
(2010-2014), the Commission will make 
proposals aiming to define a joint response to 
the granting of humanitarian visas to people 
seeking protection. This humanitarian 
protection might be less of a constraint for 
Member States than the existing conventional 
and subsidiary protection, since the rights 
offered to people benefiting from it would in all 
likelihood be more precarious.18 The Task Force 
is also planning a feasibility study on the 
possibility of processing asylum claims 
according to the joint European procedures, but 
outside of the EU. The EU’s selection of people 
who really need international protection would 
then be undertaken as close to the zones of 
conflict as possible. The externalised application 
of European procedures and criteria would 
guarantee the respect of the asylum seekers’ 
fundamental rights during the processing of 
their request. But how would the funding of 
their resettlement in Europe be organised 
should they be granted the status of refugees? 
What about the risk of these claims being 
processed in a hurry in order to reduce these 
costs? 
Beyond this, in order to address the deep 
causes of these flows like Human Rights 
infringements, conflicts, and lack of economic 
prospects, the European Council is asking for 
the appropriate support of the countries of 
transit and origin thanks to development aid 
secured as part of the European Neighbourhood 
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Policy in particular, and as part of a global 
approach to migration. 
Hence since 2005 the European Union has been 
trying to develop a global approach to 
migration based on a triple win: European 
labour market requirements would be satisfied, 
migrants would benefit from a more stable 
status and development, and the country of 
origin would be given support. The organisation 
of legal immigration should therefore help 
reduce illegal migration pressure. 
Since 2010, a European immigration portal 
provides information on Member States’ labour 
market requirements. Various directives on 
researchers, students and highly qualified staff 
aim to secure certain rights linked to the 
residence of these people such as an improved 
recognition of their diplomas, and fostering 
circular migration. 
A directive on seasonal workers that is under 
discussion at present should also help to 
develop circular migration.  
During the period 2014-2020, European 
development aid for migration will notably pass 
via a new programme named Euromed 
Migration which will represent 7% of the 
thematic actions in the Development 
Cooperation Instrument (DCI), i.e. €1.37 billion. 
It will be directed in particular towards the 
development of professional and university 
training adapted to the requirements of the 
countries of origin. Moreover, measures will be 
taken to foster migrant remittances, which 
represent more than three times the official 
figures for development aid ($406 billion in 
migrant remittances against $126 billion in world 
ODA in 201219). Mobility partnerships are also 
becoming a part of this global approach to 
migration. 
 
3.4. How can the European Union 
guarantee the implementation of its 
cooperation programme with third 
countries? 
Achieving the stated goal of improving the 
control of migration flows in the respect of 
fundamental rights will require major support 
from third countries’ asylum and border control 
systems. 
Should aid be conditioned according to 
third countries’ results in the fight to 
counter illegal immigration? European 
financial support, which is supposed to help 
reintegrating migrants in their countries of 
origin, is sometimes seen by the migrants as a 
pull factor and the conditions governing their 
allocation could be better regulated. 
However as far as border control negotiations 
are concerned, the EU is not always in a 
position of strength vis-à-vis third countries, 
which do not see the urgency of controlling 
borders as much as the EU does, since they 
benefit from migrant remittances and have to 
bear the financial burden of their readmission.  
The readmission agreements with Morocco, 
Algeria and China are struggling to become a 
reality because these countries deem the 
incentives offered by the EU inadequate. The 
agreements with Ukraine, Russia and Turkey 
were completed only once the EU had 
committed to negotiate a relaxation in their visa 
regimes on their request.20 In an extremely 
weakened state like Libya, which has many other 
concerns than its borders, a suspension of 
European aid due to a lack of efficacy in its 
border controls could be counterproductive, 
since Libya will not invest alone in borders 
checks. 
In view of the extension of the Seahorse 
Mediterranean Maritime Surveillance 
Programme, the Task Force notes that it will be 
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necessary to “convince” Tunisia, Algeria and 
Egypt to take part in this network. Conditioning 
aid may meet limited success, except in an 
extremely small number of cases. 
If it wants to involve third countries in the 
fight to counter illegal immigration the 
European Union will have to pay the price. 
The Task Force Mediterranean has suggested 
providing development aid in addition to the 
“Asylum and Migration Fund” and the “Internal 
Security Fund”. This aid will come in particular 
from the future neighbourhood instrument 
(€15.4 billion overall), the EDF (European 
Development Fund) (€30.2 billion overall) and 
even from the Stability Instrument (€2.3 billion 
overall) to help people living in refugee camps. 
As all of these funds will probably be 
insufficient, the Task Force is also calling for 
additional financing from Member States. 
In order for third States to really become 
involved in the European objectives for the 
control of migration flows, they must be 
convinced that their interests have truly 
been taken on board. In this regard migration 
financing should not be mixed up with 
development aid. The latter should not be used 
to finance border control infrastructures that do 
not have any national economic impact. 
Moreover, requests from third countries focus 
on extended legal immigration possibilities to 
the European Union, notably by the flexible 
award of visas. These requests will not diminish 
in the short term since development will not 
lead – at least at first – to a reduction in 
migration flows.21 Furthermore the ageing EU 
population needs migrants, particularly highly 
qualified people, in order to maintain its growth 
prospects.22 Therefore work to regulate legal 
migration flows, which is cheaper than 
development aid and border controls, is due to 
continue. This means strengthening the efficacy 
of the global approach to migration, which is 
often perceived as an instrument used 
excessively for “selective” immigration in the 
EU, and improving the perks that migrants and 
third countries can benefit from.  
Research should therefore continue in two 
specific areas: 
 Highly qualified migrants: at present 
Europe’s appetite for highly qualified 
migrants does not guarantee strong 
commitment in the fight to counter brain-
drains. This is notably reflected in the not 
extremely binding ethical code of conduct of 
the “Blue Card” directive. Moreover, 
Member States do not always implement the 
optional measures of this directive when they 
find themselves in competition with each 
other to attract highly qualified migrants. The 
same problem appears in the finishing 
negotiations for a directive on intragroup 
posting, which will allow international firms 
to post their employees in various Member 
States. Member States particularly concerned 
about controlling migrant entries and 
promoting competition between the various 
social systems have encountered great 
difficulties in harmonising their reception 
conditions for highly qualified migrants. They 
will therefore have to overcome their 
differences to make the rights of these 
migrants safe across the entire Union and 
make circular migration more attractive. This 
would allow the results produced by these 
migrations to be maximised for the countries 
of origin, notably via reintegration 
strategies.23 
 Migrant remittance terms, which 
represent 9 to 24% of some developing 
countries’ GDP, should also be improved 
from the point of view of reducing costs and 
increasing their impact on development.24 
This would notably mean improving the 
regulatory framework in order to step up 
competition between money transfer 
operators and to limit informal transfers, 
which are sometimes opaque. It would also 
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require the development of banking activities 
in the countries of origin using the country of 
residence as a base.25 Finally, it would require 
the support of financial innovation (e-
banking), thereby developing systems to 
finance work that will help third countries 
develop. 
CONCLUSION 
While preparing for the next European 
parliamentary elections and discussing migration 
issues, the European Union will only live up to 
its values if it does not satisfy itself with 
reinforcing its border controls and externalising 
its migration policy. It will be able to ask for 
solidarity from third countries only if it shows 
the example of being generous towards them. 
This will require supporting them in a more 
effective and innovative manner with respect to 
their asylum system and their development 
process. 
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